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Across  the  member  countries  of  the  Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Devel-
opment  (OECD),  pay-for-performance  (P4P)  programs  have  been  implemented  in the
inpatient  sector  to  improve  the  quality  of care  provided  by hospitals.  This  paper  provides
an  overview  of  34  existing  P4P  programs  in  the  inpatient  sector  in  14 OECD  countries  based
on a structured  literature  search  in ﬁve  databases  to identify  relevant  sources  in  Danish,
English,  French,  German,  Hebrew,  Italian,  Japanese,  Korean,  Norwegian,  Spanish,  Swedish
and  Turkish.  It assembles  information  on  the  design  and  effects  of  these  P4P  systems  and
discusses  whether  evaluations  of  such  programs  allow  preliminary  conclusions  to be  drawn
about the  effects  of  P4P.  The  programs  are  very  heterogeneous  in  their  aim,  the  selection
of  indicators  and  the  design  of ﬁnancial  rewards.  The  impact  of  P4P  is  unclear  and  it may
be that  the moderately  positive  effects  seen  for some  programs  can  be attributed  to  side
effects, such  as public  reporting  and  increased  awareness  of  data  recording.  Policy  makers
must decide  whether  the potential  beneﬁts  of introducing  a  P4P  program  outweigh  the
potential  risks  within  their  particular  national  or regional  context,  and  should  be  aware
that P4P  programs  have  yet  not  lived  up  to expectations.
© 2016  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  All rights  reserved.. Introduction
Across the member countries of the Organisation for
conomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), pol-
cy makers are concerned about improving the quality of
are in their health systems. Virtually all have adopted,
re in the process of adopting, or are discussing pay-for-
erformance (P4P) programs as a potential means to this
nd. In its narrow sense, P4P has been deﬁned as a way
o improve the quality of care through ﬁnancial incentives
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration
etween Health Policy and The European Observatory on Health Systems
nd Policies.
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ersität Hamburg, Esplanade 36, 20354 Hamburg, Germany.
E-mail address: Ricarda.Milstein@wiso.uni-hamburg.de (R. Milstein).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.08.009
168-8510/© 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.[1]. It is based on the understanding that health providers
can be extrinsically motivated by ﬁnancial incentives –
that is, if improvements in the quality of care are ﬁnan-
cially rewarded, greater efforts will be made to achieve
better quality [2,3]. As of January 2016, there were at least
34 programs in the inpatient sector in place. Several fur-
ther countries discuss adopting P4P in the inpatient sector.
Germany plans to introduce P4P in the inpatient sector in
2017 and Belgium has decided to pilot P4P from the second
half of 2016 on [4,5].
Despite the increasing uptake in P4P, it is not clear
how successful this instrument is. The research under-
taken on this subject to date has focused predominantly on
programs that target ofﬁce-based providers [6–8]. Draw-
ing lessons from this research for the inpatient sector
would be problematic because their incentive structure
differs markedly from that of individual physicians [9].
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Inpatient and ofﬁce-based ambulatory care providers are
generally ﬁnanced through different systems and each
payment system has a strong effect the behavior of health
providers, including how they deliver care [10,11]. Across
the OECD, hospitals are paid through diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs), global budgets, or a combination of these. In
contrast, ofﬁce-based physicians are remunerated through
a blend of capitation, fee-for-service, P4P, global budgets
and other methods [12]. Additionally, the research con-
ducted on P4P programs to date has often been limited to
the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries [8], overlooking
the increasing number of P4P programs located elsewhere.
Particularly from a policy point of view, countries with a
statutory health insurance (SHI) system may  learn more
from the experiences of countries with similar systems
rather than those with a National Health Service (NHS)
like that in England or the highly complex and varied sys-
tem of private insurance and government programs in the
US. When evidence is drawn from countries with similar
systems, there may  be less need to invest in system adjust-
ments [13,14].
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the impact of P4P
programs in the inpatient sector both within and beyond
the Anglo-Saxon countries. First, we provide an overview
of existing P4P programs. We  then take a closer look at
their aims, indicators, ﬁnancial rewards and effects. Sub-
sequently, we draw upon these ﬁndings to discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of P4P programs. Lastly, we  con-
clude by suggesting several points that policy makers might
want to consider when designing a P4P system.
2. MethodsWe  conducted a search of the following ﬁve databases:
Medline, the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, the
Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) database, the
Table: Overview of P4P programs in the inpatient sector of OECD countries (part 
Country Name Region Date N
AUS1 Clinical Practice
Improvement Payment
Queensland 2007
(ceased)
2
AUS2  National emergency
access targets, national
elective surgery target
Nationwide 2012 2
CAN1  ED P4P British Columbia 2007 1
CAN2  ED Wait Time Strategy Ontario 2008 7
CAN3  Performance-based
compensation
Ontario 2011 U
DEN  Journalauditindikatoren Southern Denmark 2009 4
ENG1  Advancing Quality Northwest England 2008 2
ENG2  Never events Throughout England 2009 U
ENG3 Commissioning for
Quality and Innovation
Throughout England 2009 U
ENG4  Best practice tariffs Throughout England 2010 D
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Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE), and
the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (NHS EED). The
following search terms were used: pay-for-performance,
payment by results, payment for quality, performance
payment, value-incentive payment, value-based purchas-
ing, and ﬁnancial incentive. To allow for the inclusion of
programs that were no longer ongoing, we did not restrict
our search by publication date. We  did, however, limit
our search to studies of programs implemented in OECD
member states and the inpatient sector. Programs which
targeted both in- and outpatient facilities simultaneously,
or where a clear separation could not be identiﬁed, were
excluded. Documents written in Danish, English, French,
German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian,
Spanish, Swedish and Turkish were considered eligible. Our
search was complemented by desk-based research of doc-
uments from ministries, other government agencies, and
statutory bodies at the federal, state and regional levels.
In selected cases, we contacted experts in the respective
countries to validate our results and add further informa-
tion. We classiﬁed the programs identiﬁed in our research
into two  groups based on whether they awarded bonuses
or levied penalties for the quality of care provided for each
medical condition separately or for a group of medical
conditions. Moreover, we classiﬁed the indicators used in
each program as being structural, procedural or outcome-
based as deﬁned by Donabedian [15]. With this overall
approach, we  identiﬁed 34 different programs in 14 of the
36 OECD countries. Our research revealed a high degree of
heterogeneity among the P4P programs. This likely reﬂects
diverging opinions about how best to design P4P programs,
as well as differing aims of their implementation. Our
results are reported in the table below (split into four parts)
and discussed in greater detail in the following sections.3. Results: Overview of P4P programs in the
inpatient sector of OECD countries
1/4).
o. of hospitals Aim(s) No. of indications
2/111 Improve quality of care for
selected medical
conditions
5
89/244 Reduce waiting times All ED/elective
cases
4 Reduce waiting times All cases in ED
4 Reduce waiting times All cases in ED
nknown Improve adherence to
national quality guidelines
Unknown
 Increase share
of patients with case
managers
All inpatient cases
4 Reduce mortality, reduce
costs, reduce length of stay
10
nknown Reduce occurance of
“Never events”
14 never events
nknown Depends on local
agreements as targets are
deﬁned by local Clinical
Commissioning Groups.
Depends on
agreement
epends on
dication
Improve adherence to
guidelines, perform
surgeries as day cases
65
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Table:  Overview of P4P programs in the inpatient sector of OECD countries (continued) (part 2/4).
Country Name Region Date No. of
hospitals
Aim(s) No. of
indications
ENG5 Non-payment for
emergency readmission
Throughout
England
2011 Not limited Reduce emergency
readmission 30 days after
discharge
Not limited
FRA1  Indication ﬁnancière à
l’amélioration de la qualité
(IFAQ 1)
Nationwide 2014 222 Predominantly to improve
documentation
–
FRA2 Indication ﬁnancière à
l’amélioration de la qualité
(IFAQ 2)
Nationwide 2016 490 Improve documentation and
selected indicators
4
ISR1
(Pay for performance)
Tel Aviv 2009
(ceased in
2011)
1 Improve outcomes of heart
and thorax surgeries, reduce
costs of complications
2
ISR2
(Never-events)
Nationwide 2011 Not limited 6
ITA1  Applicazione del percorso
assistenziale nei pazienti
ultrasessantacinquenni con
fratture di femore (PAFF)
Lazio 2009 – Reduce waiting times for
patients with hip
replacements aged 65 and
above
1
ITA2  CEO remuneration Tuscany 2006 – Improve various aspects of
care quality, such as waiting
times for hip replacements in
patients aged 65 and above
Unknown
JAP  Nationwide 2008 – Improve health outcomes of
stroke patients
1
LUX  Incitants qualité Nationwide 1998 – Improve overall quality of
care
13
NOR  Kvalitetsbasert ﬁnansiering 4 regions 2014 – Improve overall quality of
care
–
ROK
(Value incentive program)
Nationwide 2007 44 Reduce variation in quality of
care, reduce fatality rates
4
SWE1 Målrelaterat ersättning Stockholms
läns
landstin
2004 6 Improve adherence to
national quality guidelines
Depends on
agreement
SWE2  Målrelaterat ersättning Vårdgivare
i Skåne
? 10 Improve adherence to
national quality guidelines
Depends on
agreement
SWE3  Målrelaterat ersättning Uppsala län 2005 2 Improve adherence to
national quality guidelines
Depends on
agreement
SWE4  Målrelaterat ersättning Västra
Götaland-
sregion
2005 18 Improve adherence to
national quality guidelines
Depends on
agreement
TUR  Performansa dayali ek
ödeme sistemi
(performance-based
supplementary payment
system
Nationwide 2004 – Increase activity level,
improve job satisfaction of
physicians
Depends on
agreement
USA1  Hospital Quality Service Hawaii 2001 17 Improve quality of care –
USA2  Hospital Agreement
Incentive Program
Michigan 2001 86 Improve quality of care –
USA3  Hospital Quality Incentive
Demonstration Project
Nation-
wide
2003–2009
(ceased)
262 Improve quality of care 5
USA4  Massachusetts
(MassHealth) Hospital Pay
for Performance Program
Massachusetts 2008 At least 62 Reduce racial disparities in
hospital treatment
6
USA5  Non-Payment for
Hospital-Acquired
Conditions
Nationwide 2008 Unknown Reduce prevalence of
patients with
hospital-acquired conditions
13 in 2009
(changes
annually)
USA6  Hospital Value-based
purchasing (HVBP)
incentive payment
Nationwide 2011 4 783 Improve quality of care in
selected interventions
3 (changes in
2016 and
2017)
USA7  Hospital readmission
reduction program (HRRP)
Nationwide 2012 Unknown Reduce readmission rates 5
USA8  Hospital-Acquired
Condition Reduction
Program (HACRP)
Nationwide 2015 Unknown Reduce prevalence of
hospital-acquired conditions
10 in 2015
(changes in
2016 and
2017)
1128 R. Milstein, J. Schreyoegg / Health Policy 120 (2016) 1125–1140
Table: Overview of P4P programs in the inpatient sector of OECD countries (continued) (part 3/4).
Country Indicators Reward % of hospital budget Effects Side effects
Structure Process Outcome Bonus Malus Withhold
AUS1 X X <1% Unknown Unknown
AUS2  X X Unknown. Little improvement for
NEAT, almost no
improvement for NEST
Unknown
CAN1  X X < 1% Improvement, but
below government
targets
Unknown
CAN2 X X < 1% Improvement, but
below government
targets
Administrative
difﬁculties in granting
payments
CAN3  X X Up to 20% of CEO’s
income
Unknown Unknown
DEN  X X X <1% Increased share of
patients with case
managers
Contested whether
patients have actually
seen their case
managers. Danger of
“ticking the box”
ENG1  X X <4% Reduced mortality and
length of stay,
improvement in
process indicators, but
no sustainable effect in
the long-run
Unknown
ENG2 X X X <1% Unknown. Unknown.
ENG3  X X X X X X Up to 2.5% of the CCG’s
annual allocation for
non-recurrent
expenditure
Potentially
improvement in
process indicators
Very heterogeneous
programs, high
administrative burden
ENG4  X X X X <1% Improvement in
process indicators,
effect on outcomes not
clear
Administrative
difﬁculties, but
presumably lower
burden than CQUIN
ENG5  X X <1% Unknown. Unknown.
FRA1  X X <0.5% Unknown Unknown
FRA2  X X X <0.5% Unknown Unknown
ISR1  X X X <1% Positive effect on
process indicators, no
effect on surgery
outcomes
Unknown
ISR2  X X <1% Unknown Unknown
ITA1  X X <1% Decrease in waiting
time for hip
replacements, but
heterogeneous across
hospitals
Effects on waiting
times in other areas
unknown
ITA2  X X X Up to 20% of CEO’s
income
Has reduced waiting
times, but
improvement was very
heterogeneous
Effects on waiting
times in other areas
unknown
JAP  X X X <1% Positive effect on
process indicators, no
effect on outcome
indicators
Potential increase in
preferred selection of
good risks
(“cherry-picking” of
patients)
LUX  X X X X 2% Unknown Unknown
NOR  X X X 0.5% Unknown Unknown
ROK  X X X X 2% Improvement in
average quality of care,
reduced variation in
use of procedures and
patient outcomes
among hospitals
Likely prone to
unintended
consequences
SWE1  X X 2% Unknown Unknown
SWE2  X X To follow Unknown Unknown
SWE3  X X 4% Unknown Unknown
SWE4  X X X 3% Unknown Unknown
TUR  X X X X Up to 40% of
physician’s income
Has increased activity
level
Growth in activity
beyond medical
appropriateness of care
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Table:  Overview of P4P programs in the inpatient sector of OECD countries (continued) (part 4/4).
Country Indicators Reward % of hospital budget Effects Side effects
Structure Process Outcome Bonus Malus Withhold
USA1 X X X X Unknown Improvement in
process indicators,
minor increase in
patient satisfaction
Unknown
USA2  X X X X 4% Improvement in
process indicators
Unknown
USA3  X X X 2% Mixed improvement in
process indicators, no
improvement in
outcomes, no sustained
effect
Increase in health
disparities,
unreasonable
punishment of
hospitals serving
disadvantaged
population groups
USA4  X X 0.02%–0.08% No changes due to P4P
detected.
Overlap with
Medicare’s public
reporting program
USA5  X X 0.001% Improvement for some
HACs, no improvement
for others
Increase in public
attention for HACs
USA6  X X X X Up to −1% to −2% No effect detected yet Unreasonable
punishment of
hospitals serving
disadvantaged
population groups
USA7  X X Up to −3% Early research suggests
decrease in
readmissions
Increase in public
attention for
readmissions, may
increase disparities
USA8 X X Up to 1% Not evaluated yet Not evaluated yet, may
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. Results
.1. Aims
We  identiﬁed 34 P4P programs in 14 countries. They
overed a wide range of aims. At one end of the spectrum,
e found P4P programs that focused on speciﬁc targets.
our of the programs focused on meeting deﬁned targets
or waiting times. The Italian P4P program, for example,
as intended to reduce waiting times for hip replacements
mong patients aged 65 and above [41]. This aim is based on
he assumption that shorter waiting times lead to improved
utcomes. Several other programs aimed at improving the
uality of care in patients with selected conditions. For
xample, the South Korean Value-incentive payment (VIP)
argeted acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and Caesarian
ections, aiming to improve the overall performance of hos-
itals while reducing variation among them. Policy makers
n South Korea chose them for this P4P program because
he country had ranked among the worst for their care
n an OECD comparison [84]. At the other end, we identi-
ed P4P programs intended to improve the quality of care
or a range of conditions or for the inpatient sector as a
hole. The English initiative called Advancing Quality, for
xample, aimed to reduce costs and mortality for 14 con-
itions. These were chosen because the NHS Northwest
egion had performed poorly on them in a regional com-
arison, a result that could largely be explained by a high
egree of deprivation in that geographic area. Furthermore,increase disparities
–38]; Israel: [39,40]; Italy: [41,42]; Japan: [43–45]; Luxemburg: [46–49];
tates: [64–82].
those who designed the program had identiﬁed these as
conditions that would particularly beneﬁt from incentive
payments [85]. The high volume of cases and the ability to
measure quality of care through indicators also played a
role in their selection [31].
4.2. Selection of indicators
The indicators used in the P4P programs we  identiﬁed
were either of a more general nature or tied to a speciﬁc
condition. They can be grouped into structural, process and
outcome indicators [15]. Structural indicators were rarely
used. In cases where they were, they referred to speciﬁc
characteristics of a hospital or of patients. Examples of the
former are stafﬁng ratios and efﬁciency (deﬁned as average
spend per patient); an example of the latter is greater dis-
ease severity, which was  used as an indicator in the French
and Japanese P4P programs.
In contrast to structural indicators, process indicators
were used in all P4P programs. These indicators targeted
different stages in the delivery of care. Some of the process
indicators were chosen to improve diagnostic procedures
and came with a time target attached. The English Advanc-
ing Quality and Best Practice Tariffs (BPT) programs, for
example, required a CT scan or an MRI  within 24 h of admis-
sion for stroke patients. Another set of indicators focused
on the delivery of care during the inpatient stay. Pro-
cess indicators during inpatient treatment can be divided
into ﬁve categories as shown in Fig. 1, namely those that
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ion poinFig. 1. Intervent
Source: Own representation by the authors.
incentivize hospitals to follow predeﬁned treatment path-
ways, to deliver appropriate and timely pharmaceutical
treatment, to meet speciﬁc time targets, to meet certain
hospital workforce targets or to improve documentation.
Some P4P programs went beyond the inpatient stay and
rewarded hospitals for processes intended to improve
post-discharge care and avoid readmission. For exam-
ple, in the BPT program in England, the cause of low
blood sugar must be discussed with the patient before
discharge and the patient is discharged with a written
care plan, which is sent to the GP, and is offered a
structured education program within three months after
discharge.
Outcome indicators were used less frequently than
process indicators, but more commonly than structural
indicators. They were most prevalent in P4P programs
in the US. The two dominant indicators to assess health
outcomes were the 30-day mortality rate and the rate of
hospital readmissions. In very few cases, outcome indica-
tors went beyond the 30-day period, such as the Swedish
P4P program, which measured reoperation rates two years
after hip replacement surgery (Table 1).
4.3. Financial rewards
4.3.1. What to reward?
The decision about what to reward depends on the
aim of a P4P program. Two groups prevailed. In the ﬁrst
option, programs granted rewards based on an individual,
selected aspect of the care delivered for a speciﬁc condi-
tion or by a clinical department. It allowed hospitals to fail
in one P4P component without losing its eligibility for other
ones. Alternatively, programs granted awards for multiple
aims simultaneously based on an aggregate score. This type
of program followed an all-or-nothing approach because
hospitals could not decide to treat some patients under
the P4P quality criteria and other patients under standard
conditions, but had to meet minimum requirements for
all dimensions. In some cases, weights were applied,
for example to give preference to outcome over process
indicators.ts of indicators.
4.3.2. Whom to reward?
When categorizing hospitals as high or low performers,
two  methods co-existed. One option was to reward hos-
pitals based on their absolute performance. In such cases,
hospitals received a bonus if they exceeded a certain per-
formance threshold and/or incurred a penalty if they fell
below it. It is important to note that absolute scores can be
simple or stepped. In the latter case, targets are tightened at
regular intervals, making it increasingly difﬁcult for hospi-
tals to meet them [86]. The idea is to encourage continuous
improvement. In the case of simple absolute scores, the tar-
gets do not change over time. The second option was to
reward hospitals based on their relative performance. This
took three forms:
• The “tournament” [29,32] or “top-/worst-performer
award”: In this setting, the current performance of a hos-
pital was compared to that of other hospitals. Only the
best hospitals received a bonus and/or only the worst
ones incurred a penalty.
• A reward based on the performance of a hospital com-
pared to that of other hospitals over time, something
referred to as an “achievement” award [29,32,74]: This
was generally expressed as the performance of a hospital
compared to the median performance of all hospitals in
a prior period.
• An “improvement” award [87]: This can be understood
as a reward based on a hospital’s current performance
compared to its own  performance over time.
P4P programs that rewarded hospitals on a relative basis
blended these three methods in various ways as displayed
below for the Premier HQID, Advancing Quality and the VBP
incentive payment. Policy makers can decide on making
awards conditional on having won another one, or mutu-
ally exclusive (Fig. 2).4.3.3. Sticks or carrots?
P4P programs can also differ in terms of whether they
use payment withholds, bonuses, penalties, or a combina-
tion of theses. Several factors shape this decision, including
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Table  1
Overview of condition-speciﬁc indicators.
Condition Type ContentCountry
Acute conditions
AMI P Aspirin prescribed at arrivalROK, ENG1, USA3, USA6/at dischargeROK, ENG1, USA2, USA3
ACEI/ARB (for LVSD) (at discharge)ENG1, SWE, USA2, USA3
Beta blocker at arrivalUSA3/at dischargeROK, USA2, USA3
Adequate prescription of medicationFRA
Coronary circulation X-raySWE
ST elevation after reperfusionSWE
Patients with P2Y12-receptor antagonistSWE
Primary PCI received within 90 min/120 min  of hospital arrivalROK, USA3, USA6
Smoking cessation advice/counselingUSA2, USA3
Lipid-lowering therapy (on discharge)SWE, USA2
Fibrinolytic received within 30 min/60 min  of hospital arrivalROK, USA3, USA6
Diet counceling after AMIFRA
O Inpatient mortality rate (JCAHO risk adjustment)USA3/30-day mortality rateROK, USA3
Rate of readmission within 30 daysUSA3
AHRQ patient safety indicators (combined to a complication index)USA3
CABG P Aspirin prescribed at dischargeUSA3
CABG using internal mammary arteryUSA3
Prophylactic antibiotic received within 1 h prior to surgical incision and selection for surgical patients
within 48 h of surgery end timeUSA3
O Inpatient mortality rate (JCAHO risk adjustment)USA3/30-day mortality rateUSA3
Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma/psychologic and metabolic derangementUSA3
AHRQ patient safety indicators (combined to a complication index)USA3
COPD (acute) P Oxygen levels in blood checked and targeted prescribed within 48 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Steroids appropriately administered within 4 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Inhalers administered within 4 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Smoking cessation councelingENG1
Offer of referral to pulmonary rehabilitationENG1
Review of inhaler techniquesENG1
Written self-management planENG1
Home oxygen therapy assessmentENG1
Spirometry referral madeENG1
Plans for managing end stage of the diseaseENG1
Diabetes (actue) P Referred to diabetes specialist team at admission/seen within 24 h prior to dischargeENG4
Blood glucose level checked within 30 min  of hospital arrivalENG1
Foot inspection within 24 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Speciﬁc assessment carried out at recommended intervalsENG1
Blood and urine tests at regular intervalsENG1
Fluids and insulin via IV drip within 60 min  of DKA detectionENG1
Reviewed by senior clinicians within 12 h of DKA detectionENG1
Foot ulcer description within 4 h of detectionENG1
Antibiotics within 6 h of foot ulcer detectionENG1
Referred to hospital foot care team within 24 h and seen within 72 h of referralENG1
Quick acting carbohydrates given within 15 min  of low blood sugar detectionENG1
Blood glucose monitored after administration of quick acting carbohydratesENG1
Escalation of care if blood glucose remains low after 45 min  of quick acting carbohydrates being
administeredENG1
Cause of episode of low blood sugar discussed with patient before dischargeENG1, ENG4
Discharged with written care plan which is copied to the GPENG4
Offer of structured education within 3 months after dischargeENG4
Heart failure P Evaluation of LVS functionENG1, USA3, USA6
ACEI/ARB for LVSDENG1, USA3, USA6
Detailed discharge instructionsENG1, USA3
Smoking cessation advice/counselingENG1, USA3
O Inpatient mortality rate (AHRQ IQI)USA3/30-day mortality rateUSA3
Rate of readmission within 30 daysUSA3AHRQ patient safety indicators (combined to a complication
index)USA3
Pneumonia P Appropriate initial antibiotic selectionENG1, USA 3/antibiotics within 6 h after arrivalENG1
Blood culture performed in emergency department prior to ﬁrst antibiotic received in hospitalENG1*,
USA3, USA6
Inﬂuenza vaccinationUSA3, USA6/pneumococcal vaccinationUSA3, USA6
Oxygenation assessmentENG1, USA3/assessment of severity of pneumonia (“Curb-65”)ENG1
Smoking cessation advice/counselingENG1, USA3
O Inpatient mortality rate (AHRQ IQI)USA 3/30-day mortality rateUSA3
Readmission within 30-days rateUSA3
AHRQ patient safety indicators (combined to a complication index)USA3
PPH P Minimum clinical supervision in delivery roomFRA
Prevention of postpartum hemorrhageFRA
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Table  1 (Continued)
Condition Type ContentCountry
Sepsis P Screening for sepsis within 2 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Blood tests/test for level of lactic acid within 3 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Antibiotics within 3 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Second liter of IV ﬂuids/oxygen therapy within 4 h after hospital arrivalENG1
Fluid balance chart within 4 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Review by senior clinician or critical care team within 4 h of hospital arrivalENG1
Stroke S >20% are severe casesJAP
P Direct admission to, and majority of length of stay, in stroke unitENG4
Antiplatelet/anticoagulant therapy (within 48 h)AUS 1, SWE
Thrompolysis assessment/therapyENG4, SWE
Dysphagia screen within 24 hAUS 1
Time of recording of symptomsFRA
Treatment by specialist nursing, specialist neuro-intensivist care, qualiﬁed cliniciansENG4
Admission to stroke unit (within 48 h after arrival)ENG1, ENG4, SWE
Test of ability to swallowENG1
CT or MRI within 24 hENG1, ENG4
Blood thinning medication within 24 hENG1
Weighting during stayENG1
Assessment of movement/of ability to carry out day-to-day tasks within 72 hENG1
Share of patients registered in national stroke registrySWE
O >30% show improvement in activities of daily living/functional recovery at dischargeJAP
> 60% of all stroke patients discharged into the communityJAP
Major trauma P If Injury Severity Scale > 8:
Patient treated in a major trauma center (MTC)ENG4
Transferred from trauma unit to MTC  within 2 days if transferred as a non-emergency caseENG4
Tranexamic acid within 3 h of injury if applicableENG4
Trauma Audit and Research Network data completed within 25 days of dischargeENG4
If Injury Severity Scale >16:
Received by trauma-led team with consultant within 5 minENG4
Head CT within 60 min  if no emergency surgery/interventional radiology applicableENG4
Transferred from trauma unit to MTC  within 2 days if transferred as a non-emercency caseENG4
Elective/chronic conditions
Cataract P Initial diagnosis of cataract in primary careENG4
Conﬁrmation of diagnosis, listing for surgery and pre-operative assessmentENG4
Cataract removal on a day case basisENG4
Follow-up of surgery 2 weeks after surgery by nurse, optometrist or ophthalmologistENG4
Review at 4 to 6 weeks by optometristENG4
COPD P Pulmonary rehabilitation program according to standards (min. 8 weeks for exercise training,
multidisciplinary education, at least 2 exercise session per week, evaluation of quality pre- and
post-program, exercise capacity pre-and post-programAUS1
C-section P Ratio between observed and expected Caesarian section rate (based on 15 clinical risk factors)ROK
Dementia P Nutritional needs assessment within 5 days of admissionENG1
Physical health/initial pain assessment within 7 days of admissionENG1
Cognitive ability/depression assessment within 14 days of admissionENG1
Functional capacity assessment before leaving hospitalENG1
Patient focused care plan before leaving hospitalENG1
Diabetes O Share of Type 1 patients having reached treatment goal of HbA1c <5.2/7.3SWE
Share of Type 1 patients having reached treatment goal of blood pressure <139/80 mm HgSWE
Share of Type 1 patients having reached treatment goal of LDL-cholesterol <2.5 mm/LSWE
Dialysis P 85% of patients receive dialysis through functioning arteriovenous ﬁstulaENG4
O Share of patients with arteriovenous ﬁstula or arteriovenous graftSWE
Share of patients who  have achieved blood pressure treatment goalsSWE
Share of patients having reached treatment goal of Kt/V > 2 of dialysis doseSWE
Share of patients receiving dialysis at homeSWE
FHF P Surgery within 36 h after admissionENG4
Joint admission by consultant geriatrician and consultant orthopedic surgeonENG4
Assessment protocol agreed by geriatric medicine, orthopedic surgery and anesthesiaENG4
Postoperative geriatrician-directed multi-professional rehabilitation teamENG4
Fracture prevention assessment and Abbreviated Mental Tests pre/post-surgeryENG4
Hips & knees P Surgery within 24 hSWE/within 48 h for patients aged 65 and aboveITA
Prophylactic antibiotic within 1 h prior to surgical incision/discontinued within 24 h of surgery end
timeUSA3
Appropriate venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within 24 hUSA3
Pre- and postoperative period
Post-operative hemorrhage or hematoma/physiologic and metabolic derangementUSA3
Coverage of patients in national quality registry for hip replacementsSWE
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Table  1 (Continued)
Condition Type ContentCountry
O Share of patients with surgery 2 years after hip TEPSWE
Readmission within 30 days to acute care inpatient rateUSA3
AHRQ patient safety indicators (combined to complication index)USA3
Psychosis P Risk assessment within 30 days of acceptanceENG1
Assignment of care coordinatorENG1
Antipsychotic medication reviewENG1
Calculation of duration of untreated psychosis and measurement of symptom severity (using
PANSS)ENG1
Schizophrenia P Patients seen by a community mental health professional within 7 days after discharge from same
district mental health service providerAUS1
Recording antipsychotic injection (depot) medication on iPharmacyAUS1
Note: Countries appear in alphabetical order. Within countries, programs appear in historic order. AUS1: Queensland CPIP; ENG1: Advancing Quality; ENG4:
Best  Practice Tariff; ITA1: Waiting-time strategy in Lazio; JPN: Japanese stroke P4P; ROK: Value-incentive payment; SWE: Västa Gotaland; USA1: BCBS of
Michigan, USA2: Hawaii, USA3: Premier HQID, USA6: Value-best practicing program.
Some programs include additional conditions that can also be treated in the outpatient sector, such as non-acute diabetes care. We have not included these
conditions in such cases.
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nancial constraints, the desired magnitude of a program’s
ffect, acceptance of the program by hospitals, and the cul-
ural, or normative, understanding of a P4P program.
The ﬁrst factor is ﬁnancial constraints. In particular, pol-
cy makers must decide between programs that are budget
eutral and those that incur additional costs. If budget neu-
rality is less of a concern, policy makers may  choose to
se bonus payments alone, which is frequently applied.
f a P4P program needs to be budget neutral due to ﬁscal
onstraints, policy makers have a range of design options.
Payment withholds: This option involves withholding
payments prospectively and releasing them retrospec-
tively only if a hospital meets certain quality criteria.
Payment withholds combined with a redistribution
mechanism: All hospitals are subject to a withhold
payment. The ﬁnancial resources resulting from this are
subsequently redistributed to all hospitals that score suf-
ﬁciently high on the attainment or improvement score.
The amount of the incentive is adjusted based on the
ﬁnancial resources to ensure budget neutrality.
A blend of bonuses and penalties: The worst performers
receive a deduction of e.g. 2% whereas the best perform-
ers receive a bonus of 2% of the DRG payments [84].
Penalties alone: A hospitals’ DRG payment or total budget
is reduced if they do not satisfy certain quality require-
ments. In essence, this type of penalty does not differ
greatly from a withhold payment, as both approaches
involve either reducing a hospital’s DRG payment or
total budget, or leaving these unchanged. One difference,hree P4P programs.
e attainment award.
however, is that withholds are issued prospectively,
whereas penalties are imposed retrospectively (Fig. 3).
4.3.4. How much to reward?
Across the P4P programs, the effect of P4P on the total
revenue of a hospital was consistently low. Very often this
was approximately 0.1% or less, and it never exceeded 4%.
The ﬁnancial burden of such programs for governments
or health insurers was  therefore low compared to their
total annual hospital expenditure. In Advancing Quality, the
ﬁnancial volume amounted to GBP 7.1 million, of which
GBP 5 million were dispersed as bonuses. In the second
year, the volume increased to GBP 10.6 million, represent-
ing 0.1% of the total budget of the NHS North West Strategic
Health Authority. After changes in the reward structure
from bonus payments to payment withholds, the max-
imum withhold could amount to GBP 5 million [29,31].
What remains largely unclear is the effect on hospital
margins and research is inconclusive. If hospitals operate
with small hospital margins, the effect of P4P can be large
[88–91]. At the same time, payments under the HQID pro-
gram were not found to affect hospital margins [91].
4.4. Impact of the various P4P programs
Of the 34 P4P programs identiﬁed in our research, few
have been rigorously evaluated. With 17 programs in total,
half of the programs in this review have either never
been evaluated, have not been evaluated using statisti-
cal methods, or do not have evaluations available which
have been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Among the
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evaluated programs, there is a strong bias towards Anglo-
Saxon countries. Out of 46 evaluations which have been
identiﬁed, 33 of them can be allocated to programs in the
United States evaluating a total of 7 programs and four
investigations originate from England evaluating a total of
two programs, whereas the remaining programs have been
evaluated one to two times. Furthermore, 12 evaluations of
a total of 5 programs made use of difference-in-differences
or triple-differences analysis and in 16 evaluations of a total
of 6 programs, the results of the P4P program could be com-
pared to the behavior of a control group. In other cases,
however, evaluations were characterized by limitations,
including small sample sizes, the lack of a control group,
or the presence of confounding factors, such as the intro-
duction of public reporting alongside the implementation
of the P4P program [92]. Full details of these evaluations
are reported in the appendix.
4.4.1. Program effects
By and large, evaluations of P4P programs display
mixed, modest and short-lived improvements. Further-
more, causalities are unclear and various co-founding
factors exit [21,93]. For example, the effects of the Pre-
mier HQID program, which has received wide attention and
became the blueprint for several later P4P programs, have
been contested [92,73,72]. Lindenauer et al. found a modest
improvement of P4P hospitals compared to non-P4P ones
[70]. Further studies showed a slightly positive association
between process indicators and health outcomes for acute
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure and pneu-
monia [94,95]. In cases for which there was evidence of
early positive effects, these did not appear to be sustainable,
however. Five years of the HQID program, there were no
differences between participating hospitals and their non-
participating counterparts [70]. Furthermore, both P4P and
non-P4P hospitals were subject to broad public reporting
making it difﬁcult to disentangle effects [70,72].
Similar criticisms were made of the Advancing Quality
initiative in England, which was modeled on the Pre-
mier HQID program. Evaluations of the ﬁrst 18 months ofincentives in P4P programs.
Advancing Quality concluded that it was  a success. Abso-
lute mortality decreased by 1.3 percentage points among
patients with pneumonia, heart failure and acute myocar-
dial infarction. This translated into a relative reduction of
6% and 890 lives saved. The ﬁnancial volume of 13 million
pounds generated 5200 QUALYs and savings of 4.4 million
pounds due to reductions in length of stay [32]. The ini-
tially promising ﬁndings of the Advancing Quality program
do not appear to be sustainable, however [29]. Forty-two
months after the program was  introduced, the reduction in
mortality in non-participating hospitals was  greater than in
the participating ones. Conversely, the decline in mortality
for conditions which were not part of the P4P program was
greater in P4P hospitals than non-P4P programs. Due to
the frequent changes in the incentive structure of the pro-
gram, it is not clear whether the initially promising results
would have been maintained if the design had remained
unchanged.
Evaluations of one of the most recent and complex pro-
grams, the HVBP, yielded mixed results. Ryan et al. failed
to ﬁnd a correlation between the incentive payment and
improvements in clinical process or patient experience
compared to a control group in the initial implementation
period [73]. Additionally, the effect of the HVBP did not vary
depending on the hospital’s initial performance in these
two  domains. The authors did, however, ﬁnd improve-
ments before the P4P program had begun. Hospitals that
expected to be subject to the HVBP began to improve their
clinical performance about three years beforehand [73].
This pattern was  not observed for patient satisfaction [73].
Similarly, Spaulding, Zhao and Haley were unable to iden-
tify a correlation between the total performance scores
and patient safety and quality in the domain of hospital-
acquired conditions [96]. It has to be taken into account
that the results originate from the initial phase of the HVBP
program. The composition of the aggregate score based on
which incentives are granted has changed, and the ﬁnancial
amount that is withheld and redistributed has increased
since that. It is therefore not yet possible to draw ﬁnal
conclusions from these evaluations.
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.4.2. Side effects and unintended consequences
Information on the side effects of P4P programs is
ven scarcer than evaluations of their direct effects. When
vailable, such information points to several potential
ide-effects that need to be taken into account when imple-
enting a P4P program.
First, it is not clear whether P4P alters the service deliv-
ry structure of a hospital and how focusing on selected
onditions affects non-incentivized ones. If a hospital can
xpect ﬁnancial rewards in areas in which it performs well
nd penalties in aspects in which it performs poorly, it
ight seek to shift its delivery of care towards the areas in
hich it performs well to maximize incentives. For exam-
le, when focusing on readmission reduction, hospitals
ere found to reduce their admissions from the beginning
97,98]. At the same time, on a more positive note, Sut-
on et al. and Kristensen et al. noted a positive spillover
f P4P on non-incentivized conditions [29] and Ryan et al.
iscussed a potential spillover from P4P to non-P4P hospi-
als [72,73]. Second, a P4P program might increase adverse
election and thus lead to unacceptable variation in access
o care. In some cases, this is mentioned as a potential
oncern or assumed to take place, but not investigated
43,53]. In other cases, the evidence is mixed. The HVBP, for
xample, faced criticism that it unjustiﬁably punished large
nd safety-net hospitals [99,9]. Both hospital types treat
ore complex patients. At the same time, this could not
e conﬁrmed for racial differences. Third, P4P may nourish
 “teaching-to-the-test”-behavior meaning that hospitals
ay  disproportionally focus on elements which are mea-
ured while skimping in elements which are not captured
y P4P [100–102]. While this has been mentioned as a con-
ern by practitioners, but has hardly been investigated, and
f so, analyses have been inconclusive [9]. Fourth, in line
ith that, P4P may  lead to gaming with quality measure-
ent, for example by upcoding [81,92,102]. Again, while
his is generally mentioned as a concern, it has hardly been
ddressed in research [81].
Besides such active changes in their service delivery
tructure, hospitals can also be affected in a passive way
y factors that are out of their control. Several P4P pro-
rams resulted, for example, in administrative difﬁculties.
hile these might not impact on the delivery of care per
e, they can unreasonably penalize hospitals. In Ontario,
or example, incentives were granted with massive delays.
urthermore, the allocation was questionable. In the ﬁrst
ear, only three of 23 hospitals had met  the government
argets. Several hospitals that had failed to meet targets
n the ﬁrst year received even greater incentives the fol-
owing year. The hospital that had performed worst in the
rst year received the greatest amount of incentives in the
econd year [20]. Similar issues occurred with the BPTs in
ngland. There, hospitals received either a greater amount
han that to which they were entitled to, or one that was
ess than that which they should have received. Providers
nd commissioners reported limited knowledge about the
elationship between the quality provided and potential
nancial rewards and ﬁnancial constraints as problems
hey encountered in the implementation of BPTs. In some
ases, commissioners did not pay BPTs because their bud-
et did not allow them to do so, even in cases where thelicy 120 (2016) 1125–1140 1135
hospital might have been eligible [28]. Furthermore, P4P
programs are inconclusive on how to deal with inconsis-
tencies in the data which may  bias the results and wrongly
distribute rewards or penalties which was  mentioned as a
concern in the BPTs [30,104].
5. Discussion and policy recommendations
This review indicates that P4P has become an integral
part of the remuneration of hospitals in the OECD with
a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of their design.
Their evaluations, though, show that the programs yield
modest, short-term improvements at best. Thus, following
a ﬁrst wave of enthusiasm, it has been put into ques-
tion whether P4P is the most effective way to use public
money and whether it has any effect, at all [29,73,80,105].
This critique is not singular to the health care market. In
other policy ﬁelds, its effects are equally disputed, ﬁnd-
ings report mixed results and unintended consequences
might arise if the programs are not designed in a careful
way [106–108]. Even in cases where quality improvement
has been attributed to a speciﬁc P4P program, it remains
unclear whether this was caused by the program itself or
parallel developments. On top of that, it may  be ques-
tioned whether a P4P program is the smartest way  to
enhance quality. To date, it is not well understood how
this instrument compares to alternatives which come with
a lower price tag. For example, public reporting is also
positively associated with quality improvements and may
represent a suitable alternative to P4P and may  entail an
even stronger ﬁnancial incentive on hospitals if it suc-
ceeds in moving market shares [109–112]. Finally, it is
debated how the potential positive effects of P4P programs,
such as greater attention to quality as a whole, weight
against potential increases in health disparities resulting
from factors such as adverse selection, an unreasonable
penalization of hospitals caring for disadvantaged patient
groups and the potential crowding out of motivation [113].
Selected papers have pointed into the direction that P4P
may  be suspected to create extrinsic motivation rather than
respond to an already existing intrinsic motivation and that
the interactions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are not sufﬁciently understood in the health care context
[108,114–116].
When criticizing P4P, however, three aspects should
be put into consideration. To begin with, P4P programs
are seldom evaluated. Investigations of programs such as
the Premier HQID, Advancing Quality and the HVBP offer
valuable information to policy makers on how to design
a P4P. This, though, is Anglo-Saxon-dominated. Evalua-
tions of programs beyond Canada, England and the United
States, which go beyond descriptive statistics, operate with
longer time frames and allow for comparisons with a con-
trol group, are virtually non-existing. Second, evidence is
often transferred from the ambulatory care sector to the
inpatient sector without taking into account the different
setting. This ignores the growing body of literature fromcial incentives on organizations, teams and individuals
[3,117–120]. For example, evidence on the crowding-out of
motivation has been generated on the basis of individuals
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[108,114,115]. However, it has not been tested on orga-
nizations, such as a hospital. As hospitals operate under
different payment systems and occupy a different role pro-
ﬁle, evidence from individual physicians in ambulatory
care should be viewed with utmost caution and used as
an indication at best [9]. Third, all programs demonstrate
methodological ﬂaws. For example, they only reward top
performers, or grant negligible rewards which are too low
to effectively change investment patterns [28]. None of the
programs in this review incorporate the manifold lessons
learned researchers have identiﬁed over the last years.
In order to explore the full potential P4P holds in store
and to minimize negative side-effects, policy makers are
encouraged to take the following aspects into account. First,
policy makers should formulate a clear overarching aim
when introducing a P4P program which depends largely
on the context of their country. If selected conditions suf-
fer from poor quality, a P4P program which targets those
conditions explicitly appears to be reasonable. If the qual-
ity of care as a whole is of concern, or if the P4P program
shall be used to correct for deﬁciencies in the remunera-
tion system as such, a broader approach would be suitable.
This should be viewed in the context of the entire inpa-
tient system structure. For example, a P4P program which
targets waiting times or lengths of stay might be applica-
ble for a system which remunerates on budgets, but not
for a DRG-system. Hence, a P4P program can correct the
deﬁciencies of a system which has generally been under-
stood as suitable. If the P4P program shall be based on
conditions, emergency conditions are particularly suitable
because hospitals have less inﬂuence on patient choice.
Thus, potential unintended consequences of adverse selec-
tion are less likely to occur compared to a P4P program
which targets elective conditions. To further minimize the
potential impact of unintended consequences, it is recom-
mended to introduce the P4P program as a pilot project in a
selection of hospitals ﬁrst before it is rolled out to the entire
country. This allows policy makers to correct deﬁciencies
in the P4P program before it affects all hospitals.
Second, policy makers are encouraged to formulate
clear target levels depending on the P4P’s aim. A P4P
program stipulates that there is a certain ‘gold standard’
or desirable level of high quality of care. This requires
a joint understanding between policy makers, providers
and sickness funds alike on how this ought to be deﬁned
and how it can be measured. Linked with that, it demands
all actors to deﬁne which quality of care ought to be
understood as ‘normal’. On the one hand, high quality of
care can be understood as ‘normal’ and as the integer role
of hospitals. If so, it appears odd to reward hospitals for
what they should be doing in the ﬁrst place and in this case,
a system based on penalties might be more appropriate.
On the other, the aims stipulated in the P4P program can
be understood as outstanding quality ranging beyond
‘normal’. In this case, it is sensible to reward hospitals
which distinguish themselves from their compatriots by
superior quality and additional effort.Third, policy makers have to choose indicators accord-
ingly. This requires a clear understanding on the structural
prerequisites and the accompanying processes which
determine good quality of care and on the outcomes whichlicy 120 (2016) 1125–1140
are desired. P4P programs in their very core serve the
purpose of improving patient outcomes. Unfortunately,
the assumption that meeting process indicators automat-
ically improves outcomes does not hold true in all cases
[121–123]. Hence, including outcome indicators can cor-
rect for some insecurities in process indicators. It has to
be taken into account that the inclusion of outcome indi-
cators comes with the prerequisite of a comprehensive
dataset attached. Hence, policy makers have to decide
on the data based on which hospitals are evaluated and
rewarded and on how to deal with missing and inconsistent
data [104]. Information should be as objective, neutral and
comprehensive as possible and allow for risk-adjustment.
Administrative data particularly with information before
and after the hospital admission should be given preference
over self-reported data as the latter is clearly prone to fraud
which might be further supported if awards are condi-
tional on performance drawn from such data. Furthermore,
if the data set does not allow adjusting for environmental
and patient characteristics, a hospital which is located in
a disadvantaged area may  be unreasonably punished for
aspects beyond its control, whereas it may  actually deserve
to be compensated for its challenging environment. Hence,
providers may  judge the system to be unfair and try to
circumvent it [102].
Fourth, the design of the ﬁnancial incentives should be
thoughtfully aligned with the underlying understanding of
policy makers on the P4P program. They can choose from
a vast array of policy options and intervention points and
all payment systems have their advantages and disadvan-
tages [86,102]. They are tasked with the challenging job to
balance out budget constraints, effect maximization and
acceptance by providers while taking speciﬁc problems
faced by a country or region into account [86,124]. Beyond
that, the design of the incentive structure is a normative
question which depends on how the purpose of the P4P sys-
tem is understood and what is deﬁned as normal. If the level
of quality deﬁned in a given P4P program is understood
to be ‘normal’, it might appear odd to reward hospitals
for attaining a level of quality they should be providing
under normal circumstances anyway. On the other hand,
a bonus payment can be understood to ﬁll the ﬁnancial gap
that arises from providing higher quality care [28]. Indeed,
there is a growing body of academic literature supporting
the positive relationship between ﬁnancial resources and
quality of care [125]. Conditions, for which this link is par-
ticularly well understood, are AMI, pneumonia, congestive
heart failure and to some extend also stroke [126]. In this
case, paying an additional amount to compensate for costs
arising from the provision of higher care seems sensible.
Over the design process, policy makers should take four
aspects into account: To begin with, policy makers have
to decide between an absolute and a relative score. With
regards to that, providers appear to prefer a stepped abso-
lute score over relative ranking [53,124]. The former is
considered to be more transparent and is associated with
less uncertainty in terms of revenue [102]. Simple abso-
lute scores are prone to a ceiling-effect whereby hospitals
may  have an incentive to improve their performance up to
a performance threshold but not beyond [30,86]. If simple
absolute scores are used, they should be updated at regular
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ntervals, for example annually, to ensure continual quality
mprovement.
Following from that, policy makers can choose between
op-performer, attainment and improvement scores. Top-
erformer awards alone do not give any incentive to
oor-performing hospitals, which are unlikely ever to
eet the criteria. Indeed, such awards disproportionally
avor already well-performing hospitals or hospitals with
ealthier patient populations [74,102]. To address this
hortcoming, more recent P4P programs have included
ttainment and improvement awards in their reward sys-
em, and programs that have already been implemented
ave changed their incentive structure in a similar fashion
31,74,86,127]. This is largely welcomed by providers [124].
or example, the HVBP included attainment and improve-
ent scores from the start. The Premier HQID program
dded an improvement component to its top-performer
nd attainment structure and Advancing Quality has shifted
rom a tournament has shifted from a pure top-performer
core to a combination of top-performer, attainment and
mprovement scores [29,74,9].
In addition, policy makers have to decide on the amount
f the incentive, and on whether to use sticks, carrots
r both. This requires policy makers to ﬁnd a balance
etween budget constraints, political acceptance by hos-
itals and the magnitude of the effect. To begin with, the
ow incentive payment has often been criticized. Financial
ncentives were often negligible, were insufﬁcient to allow
or changes, such as the hiring of additional staff and did
ot play a role in hospital’s budget calculations [32,93,28].
s quality improvements correlate positively with the size
f incentives, policy makers are recommended to opt for
ncentives which go beyond 2% of a hospital’s budget [32].
o further maximize the incentive structure, programs
ith negative incentives, whether these be withholding
ayments, penalties alone, or a combination of bonuses
nd penalties, are often associated with greater effects
86,102]. Withholding payments has also been associated
ith changes in hospital behavior that are greater than
hose achieved through bonus payments alone [102,124].
nfortunately, it is not yet clear how withholding pay-
ents compares to a combination of bonuses and penalties.
t may  come as no surprise that providers largely favor
onus payments [53,124]. Programs that redistribute “old”
oney can be perceived as unfair compared to a hetero-
eneous distribution of bonuses [128]. In the former case,
olitical opposition from providers can be expected to be
reater, and compliance may  be lower [102]. Hence, there
s a trade-off between the magnitude of the effect and the
udget constraints, on the one side, and the acceptance of
he program on the other.
Fifth, policy makers should consider the involvement of
edical experts in the crafting of the P4P program. This
ight foster the adaptation by hospitals and physicians
ecause they have been integrated in the decision process
nd do not have the impression that the P4P program is
ot yet another policy which has been imposed in them
y policy makers in a top-down approach [102,129,130].
n addition to that, medical societies might make valuable
ontributions on the selection of indicators to best measure
he quality of care of a hospital [124].licy 120 (2016) 1125–1140 1137
Sixth, policy makers have to ensure that their P4P pro-
gram is accompanied by an evaluation process which meets
academic standards. To date, the possibility to draw conclu-
sions from P4P programs is impeded by the absence of solid
evaluations. Selected countries, such as the United King-
dom, have institutionalized the evaluation of programs.
This should be regarded as self-evident given the ﬁnancial
volume which is at stake even if it is small in comparison
to the total budget of acute cares. Furthermore, evaluations
can point at deﬁciencies in the design and unveil unin-
tended consequences through which a P4P program might
do more harm than good. In addition, the criticism with
regards to the lack of evaluations is not going to change if
policy makers do not commission evaluations or support
them by providing data. This includes that they have to
accept the potential failure of a P4P program if the eval-
uation shows that the program could not live up to the
expectations.
This paper has several important limitations. First, the
evidence base for P4P programs remains weak. Thus, policy
recommendations should be made with caution [92]. Sec-
ond, this review is not a systematic one. Due to that is does
not provide a strong assessment and meta-analysis on the
quality of evaluations, but also includes studies of weaker
statistical quality. Third, language limitations led to Eastern
European countries not being investigated with the inten-
sity they deserve. Fourth, this paper could not assess further
vital aspects of the success of P4P programs. For exam-
ple, it did not report information about the hospital level
that had been incentivized. This could be the hospital as
a whole, a hospital department, a clinical team or individ-
ual clinicians. This dimension had to be excluded because
information was not available. Fifth, this paper displayed
the ﬁnancial magnitude on P4P in comparison to its total
budget. However, it may  be much more important to look
at the effect of P4P on hospital margins. Unfortunately, this
is hardly reported in research and for the sake of compara-
bility we  wanted to choose an indicator we  can report for all
P4P programs [91]. Sixth, P4P programs are generally part
of a larger package of policies, such as changes in the remu-
neration system, the introduction of public reporting or the
direct integration of quality criteria into the base payment.
These elements alone may  already lead to an improvement
in quality of care. Seventh, various programs change fre-
quently. Even if we take into account that hospitals are very
price-sensitive, they might still require some time to adapt
to the new scheme.
These difﬁculties, which hamper policy makers and
researchers alike, call for additional research to better
understand how the various design elements and inter-
vention points of P4P are received by hospitals. To begin
with, there is a lack of understanding which dynamics a
P4P program unfolds within a hospital [9]. For example, it
may  be that hospitals start reviewing the performance of
clinical teams and departments or whether they rearrange
the way they deliver care [28]. Additionally, while we can
generally assume that greater ﬁnancial resources improve
quality of care, we do not know how much precisely hospi-
tals need to arrive at better levels and how P4P impacts
hospital margins. As P4P intends to change investment
decisions and to provide hospitals with the ﬁnancial means
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they need to provide better quality of care, it is necessary
to ensure that the additional money granted is sufﬁcient
to ﬁll this gap [131,132]. At the same time, it should not
be too much in order not to waste money that could be
better invested elsewhere. Furthermore, we do not know
sufﬁciently enough about how P4P compares to alternative
policy instruments to enhance quality of care. In times of
ﬁnancial constraints, policy makers may  want to maximize
the utility of public money. Policy makers will have to con-
trast P4P to alternative means such as public reporting and
mandatory structural indicators for hospitals to perform
certain interventions, such as minimum volumes.
6. Conclusion
This review has shown that P4P is widely used in
OECD countries. Evaluations to date show that the pro-
grams reviewed yield modest, short-term improvements
at best. However, it has to be taken into account that
they also unveil numerous methodological ﬂaws imply-
ing that they may  not have explored the full potential of
P4P. To boost its success, policy makers are invited to take
the current state of scientiﬁc evidence into account. This
implies a clearly formulated aim and transparent target
levels, the preference of emergency to elective conditions,
the integration of outcome indicators and of attainment
and improvement awards to a top-performer score and
the combination of withhold payments with a bonus. Fur-
thermore, policy makers should stress the use of objective
data and commission a robust, scientiﬁc evaluation of
P4P to ensure continuous improvement. Finally, policy-
makers are invited to carefully weigh the expected gains of
P4P against its potential side-effects and against suitable
alternatives, such as public reporting.
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